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NON-RECOGNITION OF RED CHINA: REASONS AND RATIONALIZATIONS
KEITH S. PETERSEH
Arkansas State Teachers College
In 1949 the Nationalist government of China, under the leadership of Chiang
K i-shek, was driven off the China mainland to an uncertain island refuge on For-
-a by its long-time civil war enemy, the Chinese Communists. These Chinese Reds
subsequently proclaimed at Peiping September 29, 1949 that they were the new Com-
munist government of China, the so-called Peoples' Republic. Party Chairman Mao
Tse-tung became Chairman of the Central Peoples' Government. His regime, three
days later, made a formal request for recognition by the foreign governments that
had consulates at Peiping--including the United States.
Some nations extended recognition immediately. The United States, among
others, did not. There were no reasons, in particular, for the refusal to act at
this early date--except time, to wait to see what would happen.
But what sort of thing was to be looked for in that waiting period? The
basis of the impending recognition decision apparently was a matter of some dif-
ference of opinion. Twenty-five consultants, including scholars, businessmen, and
politicians, met October 6-8, 1949, at Washington to advise the State Department
on its Red China recognition problem. Thirteen of these consultants favored
recognition in time, three were opposed to recognition, and nine were noncommital.
A clear ma jority thus recommended that the United States recognize Red China, but
only at a later and more appropriate time.
The representatives of the State Department agreed that recognition of Red
China by the United States would have to wait. But there was less agreement on
what the United States was waiting for. The advisors were waiting to see if the
Mao Tse-tung regime was actually in control of China; the Department was waiting
to see how the Mao Tse-tung regime behaved.
Itbehaved badly. It repudiated the Nationalist United Nations delegation
and announced that it would re-examine all Nationalist treaties, deciding in due
course which it would keep and which it would scrap. A new revolutionary govern-
ment might be expected to do this to its predecessor, but the predecessor in this
instance was still recognized by the United States. Consequently, such precipi-
tous action was not calculated to win American favor.
More directly and dramatically, the Peiping regime brought pressure to bear
on individual American officials and citizens in China. Itcaused the arrest of
United States Consul-General Angus Ward at Mukden October 24. Ward and others on
his staff were arrested for alleged assault on a Chinese employee. A month later
Mukden Vice Consul William Stokes was taken into court and questioned about his
alleged espionage activity.
Red China was trying to force the American hand. It would not be forced.
When Peiping finally repudiated the Nationalist delegation in the United Nations,
as itdid November 16, the United States immediately announced its support of
the Nationalist delegation. That same day, in a press conference, Secretary of
State Dean Acheson gave his reasons. The arrest of Angus Ward, Acheson said, had
killed any chance of early recognition of Red China. In short, bad behavior was
the reason.
Then for a while, tensions seemed to relax. Angus Ward and the others, sen-
tenced to various terms, were released and deported November 24. India became
the first non-Communist country to recognize the Peiping government December 30,
1949. Britain followed suit seven days later. The West seemed to be moving toward
recognition. The following week, on January 12,Secretary Acheson spoke on Asiatic
Policy to the National Press Club in Washington. He complained bitterly against
the Soviet Union, to be sure, for "detaching" Manchuria and other areas from
Pull text of these conversations in U. S. Department of State, Transcript of Round TableDiscussion on American Policy Toward China Held in the Department of State, October 6, 7,
a"d 8, 1949. (Confidential classification cancelled).
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•St. Louis Post-Dispatch, 17 November, 1949.
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actual Chinese control, but his speech was in general conciliatory of the Peiping
regime. 3 The State Department still was waiting and watching.
Itdid not have to wait long. Two days later, January 14, the Chinese Commu-
nists forcibly took over the consulates of the United States, France, and TheNetherlands, in Peiping. IfRed China seriously were seeking American recogni-
tion--this is open to possible doubt--this was not the way to do it. The United
States reacted quickly and angrily. It closed all its China consulates and or-
dered all American officials out. Administration Spokesman Senator Tom Connally
of Texas endorsed this action. "The Chinese Communist government," he explained
in a statement released to the press that night, "is seeking recognition. But no
nation is entitled to recognition when it does not respect international law and
does not respect the representatives of other governments and the rights of their
citizens."* Itwas less a lawyer's theoretical complaint than a demand for a mini-
mum of common decency and the ordinary mutual conveniences of diplomacy.
The Netherlands, apparently pressured in part by this consulate seizure,
extended recognition to the offending Peoples' Republic March 27, 1950. The Unit-
ed States did not, and Red China's early opportunity for recognition was lost.
The basic standard for continuing non-recognition was still, in the main, bad
behavior.
It was in this atmosphere of angry suspension, on June 25, 1950, that Com-
munism launched its lightning invasion of South Korea. For the moment, all other
problems were pushed aside. Through the summer of 1950 hard-pressed and under-
manned South Korean, American, and other United Nations forces were pushed back
to the "Pus an perimeter." The tide turned with the Inchon landings of mid-Septem-
ber and by early October the 38th parallel had been recrossed. The general feel-
ing in the West was that the war was over. In General Douglas MacArthur's phrase,
the boys would be
"
home for Christmas."^
Chinese Communists ,however , had other ideas. Peiping' s premier, Chou En-lai,
had warned October 1 that Red China would
"
not supinely tolerate seeing their
neighbors being savagely invaded by imperialists." In late October, Chinese
"volunteers" began to take the field. On November 26, in overwhelming numbers,
the Chinese
"
volunteers" launched a crushing counterof fensive. Two days later
MacArthur was forced to report to the United Nations: "We face an entirely new
war." 7 And the United Nations lost it. Or at least, it did not win it. The ex-
planation and the symbol of this frustration was Communist China. This was not
mere misbehavior. This was war. And in war, one must hate the enemy. Consequent-
ly, the recognition issue became clouded with ideology.
Assistant Undersecretary of State Dean Rusk addressed the 25th anniversary
dinner meeting of the China Institute of America May 18, 1951. It was both a
tirade and a turning point. Said Rusk:
We do not recognize the authorities in Peiping for what they pre-
tend to be. The Peiping regime may be a colonial Russian government--
a Slavic Manchukuo on a larger scale. Itis not the government of China.
Itdoes not pass the first test. It is not Chinese.
Itis not entitled to speak for China in the community of nations.
It is entitled only to the fruits of aggression upon which itis now
willfully,openly and senselessly embarked.
3 Full text in U. S. Department of State, Bulletin xxii:551 (23 January, 1950), 111-118.
4 New York Times, 15 January, 1950.
5 St. Louis Post-Dispatch, 26 November, 1950.
6 Arkansas Gazette, 2 October, 1950.
7 St. Louis Post-Dispatch, 29 November, 1950.
See, for example, the melancholy prophecy of the idealist, Woodrow Wilson, immediately prior
to America's entrance into World War I:"Anation couldn't put its strength into a war and
keep its head level; it had never been done." Quoted in Morison and Commager, The Growth of
the American Republic (3rd edition, New York, 1942) II,468-9.
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We recognize the National Government of the Republic of China,
even though the territory under its control is severely restricted. We
believe it more authentically represents the views of the great body
of the people of China, particularly their historic demand for inde-
pendence from foreign control. 9
It was the difference between the free and the un-free. Furthermore, Rusk
added, ifin spite of their Russian Communist masters
"
the Chinese people decide
for freedom, they shall find friends among all the peoples of the earth who have
known and love freedom." This was a thinly veiled threat to wage eternal war
against the Communist government of China until it was overthrown.
Future Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, from the same platform, was
less subtle. The Mao Tse-tung regime was without doubt, in his estimation, a
"puppet regime" and any opposition to it should receive encouragement and, by
inference, assistance from the United States. 10 This would appear to be the ker-
nel of the famous
"
liberation" idea that Dulles expounded so actively during the
1952 presidential campaign and since.
The thinking expressed here by Rusk and Dulles continues in United States
policy. Satelliteism, or subservience to Moscow in particular, was united with
bad behavior in a new double standard of non-recognition. These were the main
themes. But other propositions, sometimes incidentally revealed, are also worthy
of attention. For example, November 25, 1949, nearly two months after the proc-
lamation of the Peoples' Republic of China, a new government was installed by
coup d'etat in Panama--a bloodless revolution engineered by the national chief
of police, his third such action in six days. Three weeks later the United States
recognized this government. Why? Because the transition had been realized without
any
" foreign intervention." 1J Thus the means were apparently less important than
the pedigree. By extension, this standard also applied to Red China, which was,
of course, not recognized.
Also, in October 1951, when his qualifications as United States delegate to
the United Nations were being investigated by a subcommittee of the Senate For-
eign Relations Committee, Ambassador-at-large Phillip Jessup was asked his opin-
ion on the question of recognizing the Mao Tse-tung regime. He recalled an Ache-
son Formula of recognition "more than two years ago": That a government control
the country it claims to control, that it recognize its international obliga-
tions, and that it rule with the acquiescence of the people who are ruled. 12
"Under the present circumstances," Jessup concluded without further elaboration,
"we cannot recognize Communist China." It was not clear here which counts were
being held against Peiping. Certainly there was little doubt about its control
of China; if anything, this test should have worked hardship only on the Nation-
alists who were in effective control of approximately one- third of one per cent
of the territory usually included in the Chinese political unit. The fact that
the Communists did not' recognize their international obligations was mostly a
repetition—none the less valid--of the bad behavior charge. The prerequisite of
ruling with the acquiescence of the people was an added item in the general ide-
ological complaint which has received new emphasis since 1950.
Altogether, then, the continuing indictment which is the basis for non-rec-
ognition of the Peoples' Republic of China seems to include: That ithas misbe-haved, that it was established through
"foreign intervention," that it is not
entitled" to speak for China (because of its apparent status as a "colonial
Russian government"), and that it does not rule "with the acquiescence of the
people who are ruled."
An argument that the final standard—acquiescence-- is entirely unreal can
"e demonstrated easily by reference to the American policy toward other new and
questionably democratic regimes during the period covered by these events. From
Complete text in State Department Bulletin xxiv
W Ibld.
621 (28 May, 1951), 843 ff.
St. Louis Post-Dispatch, 15 December, 1949
12 New York Times, 13 October, 1949.
St. Louis Post-Dispatch, 6 October, 1951.
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September 1949 to the present, the United States has extended recognition, almost
immediately, to governments by coup d'etat in Panama, as already noted, in Syria
December 17, 1951, in Cuba March 27, 1952, and in Bolivia June 2, 1952.
This contrary practice seems to cast additional doubt on the validity of
the
"
colonial Russian government," or satellite charge--if what is meant here is
that this further proves that the government in question is without popular sup.
port. The same might be said concerning
"foreign intervention" in the initiative
stages of any regime. If the complaint is, however, against Russian domination
and Russian intervention in particular, then there is also obvious conflict with
the original and continued recognition of all firmly established Russian satel-
lite states and, indeed, of Russia herself. And yet, in October 1952, when Re-
publican Senator William Knowland of California called, logically, for the break-
ing of diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union in retaliation for their having
demanded the recall of United States Ambassador to Moscow George F. Kennan, Sec-
retary Acheson refused to undertake such action. Acheson based his decision on
the grounds that it"would be a step of the utmost seriousness with worldwide
consequences.
*
If there is any point innot recognizing the existence of things
Russian, then there is much un-recognizing to be done.
Misbehavior, and American displeasure with it,seems to be the one sincerely
valid count against Communist China. But it is important to realize that non-
recognition based on this reasoning, places the United States in a serious di-
lemma. It cannot easily trade recognition for China's good behavior if good
behavior is the precondition of the United States and recognition is the pre-
condition for the Chinese Reds. As Correspondent Thomas J. Hamilton points out
in a recent newspaper dispatch from United Nations, New York, the United Nations
probably cannot get a general truce in Korea without recognizing Communist China,
nor can the United Nations readily extend that recognition without first getting
a general truce. 5
The additional problem of dealing with realities, regardless of preference,
was revealed strikingly last spring by a diplomatic dilemma of a different sort.
The United States, Great Britain, and France submitted to the United Nations Dis-
armament Commission May 28, 1952, a proposal for limiting the size of armies
among the great powers. A ceiling of 700,000 or 800,000 men was to be fixed for
Britain and France and of 1,500,000 for the United States, the Soviet Union,
and--" China.
"
The last designated party was nowhere otherwise defined in the
plan. Since the Nationalist government on Formosa has, by the most optimistic
estimates, no more than 500,000 men under arms, its adherence to such agreement
would have been meaningless. When questioned later about which one of the two
Chinas was meant, Western representatives differed in opinion somewhat, at least
in degree. French Delegate Jules Moch was quoted as saying that "nobody had
thought of Formosa" in this connection. 16 Great Britain's Sir Gladwyn Jebb
"
made
it obvious that he had Communist China in mind.
"^ American delegates, however,
according to reputable report, "displayed a great reluctance to state flatly
that 'China' was Communist China. They were afraid that direct mention of Commu-
nist China might involve them in the problem of recognition. In their corridor
explanations they preferred to say that they were talking about whatever China
was in command of the troops on the Chinese mainland." 18
This was sheer fantasy. Ifthe United States is currently unwilling or un-
able to call a fact a fact, even when, as in this instance, it was in its own
obvious best interests to do so, it will find the real world, at least in Asia,
increasingly difficult to deal with. We must keep in mind that misbehavior is
the only defensible standard on which our non- recognition of the Peoples' Repub-
lic of China is based. Ifwe can bargain it away, which apparently was our in-
tention in withholding recognition in the first place, for better behavior, as
14 New York Times, 8 October, 1952
15 Ibid., 13 January, 1953.
16 St. Louis Post-Dispatch, 31 May, 1952.
17 A. M. Rosenthal dispatch to the New York Times, 29 May, 1952.
18 Ibid.
78
Journal of the Arkansas Academy of Science, Vol. 7 [1955], Art. 21
http://scholarworks.uark.edu/jaas/vol7/iss1/21
1
NON-RECOGNITION OF RED CHINA
79
•
possibly in Korea, or for achievement of our best interests, as in disarmament,
e must be prepared to do so, regardless of extraneous ideological overtones. We
must remember when and if the time for hard bargaining comes, particularly inKorea--and the writer is not predicting that it necessarily willcome- -that words
are not meanings and symbols are not realities.
United States non-recognition of the Peoples' Republic of China has been
imposed since 1949, and thus far ineffectually, as a sanction. The sanction has
been employed legitimately only against misbehavior. If it works at all, which
it may not, the United States must be willing to abandon it in return for the
results it was designed to achieve.
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